unit 8 essay

question- write a review of the article. Your article review must be a minimum of two pages in length. Be sure to address each of the following points in your article review. Identify the premise of the article and supporting points. How does the author describe organizational behavior? Why is organizational behavior important? Which business concepts covered in this course were you able to identify? has to be your own words or i fail unless its quoted and is marked on the reference page

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article from the CSU library Business Source Complete—- this issue, as our results indicate that conservative and liberal boards differ in

how they reward and penalize their CEOs for prior performance. Results show

that conservative boards more tightly link CEO pay to recent financial perfor-

mance, which is to be expected given their tendency toward person-based

attributions. Our theory suggests that this relationship is a direct consequence

of the conservative preference for proportionality in rewards, which conserva-

tives believe to be an inherently desirable and fair arrangement and therefore

instrumental in retaining CEO talent.

Although the significant interaction between ideology and prior performance

demonstrated support for our theory (H2), an interesting finding was that liberal

and conservative boards in our sample did not meaningfully differ in the

amounts they paid their CEOs following poor financial performance. The differ-

ence became apparent only as performance increased. Using the coefficients

in table 2 to examine the difference in CEO pay granted by conservative and lib-

eral boards (

+

1 and –1 S.D. of board conservatism, respectively) following

good accounting performance (

+

1 S.D. of ROA), our results suggest that con-

servative boards pay their CEOs around 14 percent more than liberal boards in

similar situations. This heightened pay sensitivity is even more apparent when

considering market performance, as our results indicate that conservative

boards will pay their CEOs around 18 percent more than will liberal boards fol-

lowing a year of good performance (

+

1 S.D. of TSR). Conservative boards thus

appear to more strongly subscribe to agency theory prescriptions regarding

pay–performance sensitivity, but this leads to meaningful differences in pay

only at the higher end of the performance spectrum.

When considered in tandem with the board conservatism main effect, how-

ever, this is not necessarily surprising. The general tendency to ascribe a higher

value to the CEO position (controlling for prior performance) coupled with the

more pronounced belief that CEOs have earned their positions through ability

and hard work (as system justification theory suggests) helps explain why con-

servative boards do not penalize CEOs so harshly that their pay falls below

what a liberal board would pay under similar conditions. In other words, it

appears that although conservative boards punish CEOs more harshly for poor

performance in a relative sense—the slope of the relationship between pay

and performance is steeper for conservative boards—they also assess these

penalties relative to a higher baseline reference point, i.e., board conservatism

has a positive main effect on pay.

Future Research on Board Political Ideology

Our study represents an important first step in unpacking the ideological foun-

dations of corporate governance. By showing that boards’ ideological beliefs

manifest in their decisions on CEO pay, we hope to encourage future research

on the implications of board ideology across an array of domains. We envision

that board ideology will be a particularly meaningful predictor of (1) boards’

decisions related to governance and firm strategy, (2) boards’ information dis-

semination behaviors, and (3) boards’ influences on other organizational actors

whose own ideological orientations will shape how they interact with firms.

First, our ideas should be readily generalizable to other governance out-

comes. We focused on CEO pay arrangements, but conservative and liberal

boards may also have divergent views on what constitutes an appropriate

22

Administrative Science Quarterly 62 (2017)

CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Conservatives tend to be more tolerant of income

inequality than are liberals (Mitchell et al., 2003), which implies that conserva-

tive boards will be more accepting of a large CEO–worker pay gap. Political

ideology may also play a role in shaping how boards respond to failures, such

as bankruptcies, accounting restatements, and product recalls, as conservative

and liberal boards may differ in both the extent to which they place blame on

the individuals at the top of the firm and in their views on appropriate penalties

for failure (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2013). It is also possible that a board’s ideological

beliefs will manifest in the guidance it offers to top managers on strategic deci-

sions such as acquisitions, divestitures, and new product launches. Relatedly,

the broader question of whether and when board ideology will supersede CEO

ideology in shaping a firm’s strategy remains unexplored, and future research

examining how board ideology enhances or hinders CEO discretion could yield

important new insights.

A second potentially fruitful avenue for future research pertains to the diffu-

sion of practices between and among boards of directors. Researchers have

shown that directors act as conduits in the diffusion across networks of gov-

ernance practices, such as poison pills and golden parachutes (Davis and

Greve, 1997), and strategic tendencies, such as international diversification

(Connelly et al., 2011), but this literature has largely overlooked the idea that

directors’ individual preferences will influence the extent to which they partici-

pate in diffusion processes (Shropshire, 2010). Our arguments suggest that

directors may differ in their motivation to advocate for a given practice accord-

ing to how well the practice aligns with their political ideologies. For instance,

conservative directors will arguably be more inclined to buy into the neoclassi-

cal economics assumption of universal self-interest (cf. Jost et al., 2003a),

which may in turn cause them to more actively promulgate governance prac-

tices aimed at reining in managerial opportunism. Along these lines, perhaps

liberal directors play a more central role in the spread of corporate social

responsibility practices across the business landscape. These are just some of

many potential avenues worth exploring in the domain of director ideology and

the diffusion of corporate practices.

Finally, it could be interesting to investigate how board ideology affects the

perceptions and actions of other organizational stakeholders (e.g., Briscoe,

Chin, and Hambrick, 2014). For instance, the increasing prevalence of share-

holder ‘‘say-on-pay’’ votes offers an opportunity for scholars to develop new

insights into how shareholders act on their governance preferences (Krause,

Whitler, and Semadeni, 2014). Our theory raises the possibility that board ideol-

ogy will influence how shareholders perceive and subsequently vote on CEO

pay proposals. Relatedly, some shareholders may prefer to invest in companies

whose boards’ ideologies align with their own, as this would signal congruence

in objectives. Top executives may exhibit a similar preference for homophily

when deciding where to work. Lastly, secondary stakeholders such as social

activists may partially base their strategic and tactical decisions on the degree

to which their espoused ideological views align with or differ from targets’

board ideologies.

Executive compensation has long been among the most widely debated

topics in the social sciences, with corporate governance scholars in particular

devoting considerable effort to understanding the logic behind CEO pay. Our

study offers a new vantage on corporate governance by demonstrating that the

Gupta and Wowak

23

political ideologies of boards of directors manifest in their decisions about CEO

pay. The contrasting belief systems that characterize liberal and conservative

ideologies represent different philosophies on how to govern, an implication of

which is a more heterogeneous perspective on exactly what constitutes good

governance. We hope that our study will serve as a foundation for future

inquiry on the organizational implications of board political ideology.

Acknowledgments

We thank Abhijith Acharya, Warren Boeker, Forrest Briscoe, Craig Crossland, Don

Hambrick, and Vilmos Misangyi for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this

paper.

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Authors’ Biographies

Abhinav Gupta

is an assistant professor of management at the University of

Washington’s Foster School of Business, 527 Paccar Hall, Seattle, WA 98195 (e-mail:

abhinavg@uw.edu). His current research focuses on understanding how political ideolo-

gies of organizational stakeholders, including employees, legislators, and elites, influ-

ence organizational practices. He also studies interorganizational diffusion, social

activism, corporate governance, and strategic leadership. He received his Ph.D. in man-

agement from the Smeal College of Business of the Pennsylvania State University.

Adam J. Wowak

is an assistant professor of management at the University of Notre

Dame’s Mendoza College of Business, 353 MCOB, Notre Dame, IN 46556 (e-mail:

awowak@nd.edu). His research focuses on strategic leadership and corporate govern-

ance, with a particular emphasis on top executives and their effects on organizational

outcomes. He received his Ph.D. in management from the Pennsylvania State

University.

30

Administrative Science Quarterly 62 (2017)

 
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