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unit 8 essay
question- write a review of the article. Your article review must be a minimum of two pages in length. Be sure to address each of the following points in your article review. Identify the premise of the article and supporting points. How does the author describe organizational behavior? Why is organizational behavior important? Which business concepts covered in this course were you able to identify? has to be your own words or i fail unless its quoted and is marked on the reference page
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Order Paper Nowarticle from the CSU library Business Source Complete—- this issue, as our results indicate that conservative and liberal boards differ in
how they reward and penalize their CEOs for prior performance. Results show
that conservative boards more tightly link CEO pay to recent financial perfor-
mance, which is to be expected given their tendency toward person-based
attributions. Our theory suggests that this relationship is a direct consequence
of the conservative preference for proportionality in rewards, which conserva-
tives believe to be an inherently desirable and fair arrangement and therefore
instrumental in retaining CEO talent.
Although the significant interaction between ideology and prior performance
demonstrated support for our theory (H2), an interesting finding was that liberal
and conservative boards in our sample did not meaningfully differ in the
amounts they paid their CEOs following poor financial performance. The differ-
ence became apparent only as performance increased. Using the coefficients
in table 2 to examine the difference in CEO pay granted by conservative and lib-
eral boards (
+
1 and –1 S.D. of board conservatism, respectively) following
good accounting performance (
+
1 S.D. of ROA), our results suggest that con-
servative boards pay their CEOs around 14 percent more than liberal boards in
similar situations. This heightened pay sensitivity is even more apparent when
considering market performance, as our results indicate that conservative
boards will pay their CEOs around 18 percent more than will liberal boards fol-
lowing a year of good performance (
+
1 S.D. of TSR). Conservative boards thus
appear to more strongly subscribe to agency theory prescriptions regarding
pay–performance sensitivity, but this leads to meaningful differences in pay
only at the higher end of the performance spectrum.
When considered in tandem with the board conservatism main effect, how-
ever, this is not necessarily surprising. The general tendency to ascribe a higher
value to the CEO position (controlling for prior performance) coupled with the
more pronounced belief that CEOs have earned their positions through ability
and hard work (as system justification theory suggests) helps explain why con-
servative boards do not penalize CEOs so harshly that their pay falls below
what a liberal board would pay under similar conditions. In other words, it
appears that although conservative boards punish CEOs more harshly for poor
performance in a relative sense—the slope of the relationship between pay
and performance is steeper for conservative boards—they also assess these
penalties relative to a higher baseline reference point, i.e., board conservatism
has a positive main effect on pay.
Future Research on Board Political Ideology
Our study represents an important first step in unpacking the ideological foun-
dations of corporate governance. By showing that boards’ ideological beliefs
manifest in their decisions on CEO pay, we hope to encourage future research
on the implications of board ideology across an array of domains. We envision
that board ideology will be a particularly meaningful predictor of (1) boards’
decisions related to governance and firm strategy, (2) boards’ information dis-
semination behaviors, and (3) boards’ influences on other organizational actors
whose own ideological orientations will shape how they interact with firms.
First, our ideas should be readily generalizable to other governance out-
comes. We focused on CEO pay arrangements, but conservative and liberal
boards may also have divergent views on what constitutes an appropriate
22
Administrative Science Quarterly 62 (2017)
CEO-to-worker pay ratio. Conservatives tend to be more tolerant of income
inequality than are liberals (Mitchell et al., 2003), which implies that conserva-
tive boards will be more accepting of a large CEO–worker pay gap. Political
ideology may also play a role in shaping how boards respond to failures, such
as bankruptcies, accounting restatements, and product recalls, as conservative
and liberal boards may differ in both the extent to which they place blame on
the individuals at the top of the firm and in their views on appropriate penalties
for failure (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2013). It is also possible that a board’s ideological
beliefs will manifest in the guidance it offers to top managers on strategic deci-
sions such as acquisitions, divestitures, and new product launches. Relatedly,
the broader question of whether and when board ideology will supersede CEO
ideology in shaping a firm’s strategy remains unexplored, and future research
examining how board ideology enhances or hinders CEO discretion could yield
important new insights.
A second potentially fruitful avenue for future research pertains to the diffu-
sion of practices between and among boards of directors. Researchers have
shown that directors act as conduits in the diffusion across networks of gov-
ernance practices, such as poison pills and golden parachutes (Davis and
Greve, 1997), and strategic tendencies, such as international diversification
(Connelly et al., 2011), but this literature has largely overlooked the idea that
directors’ individual preferences will influence the extent to which they partici-
pate in diffusion processes (Shropshire, 2010). Our arguments suggest that
directors may differ in their motivation to advocate for a given practice accord-
ing to how well the practice aligns with their political ideologies. For instance,
conservative directors will arguably be more inclined to buy into the neoclassi-
cal economics assumption of universal self-interest (cf. Jost et al., 2003a),
which may in turn cause them to more actively promulgate governance prac-
tices aimed at reining in managerial opportunism. Along these lines, perhaps
liberal directors play a more central role in the spread of corporate social
responsibility practices across the business landscape. These are just some of
many potential avenues worth exploring in the domain of director ideology and
the diffusion of corporate practices.
Finally, it could be interesting to investigate how board ideology affects the
perceptions and actions of other organizational stakeholders (e.g., Briscoe,
Chin, and Hambrick, 2014). For instance, the increasing prevalence of share-
holder ‘‘say-on-pay’’ votes offers an opportunity for scholars to develop new
insights into how shareholders act on their governance preferences (Krause,
Whitler, and Semadeni, 2014). Our theory raises the possibility that board ideol-
ogy will influence how shareholders perceive and subsequently vote on CEO
pay proposals. Relatedly, some shareholders may prefer to invest in companies
whose boards’ ideologies align with their own, as this would signal congruence
in objectives. Top executives may exhibit a similar preference for homophily
when deciding where to work. Lastly, secondary stakeholders such as social
activists may partially base their strategic and tactical decisions on the degree
to which their espoused ideological views align with or differ from targets’
board ideologies.
Executive compensation has long been among the most widely debated
topics in the social sciences, with corporate governance scholars in particular
devoting considerable effort to understanding the logic behind CEO pay. Our
study offers a new vantage on corporate governance by demonstrating that the
Gupta and Wowak
23
political ideologies of boards of directors manifest in their decisions about CEO
pay. The contrasting belief systems that characterize liberal and conservative
ideologies represent different philosophies on how to govern, an implication of
which is a more heterogeneous perspective on exactly what constitutes good
governance. We hope that our study will serve as a foundation for future
inquiry on the organizational implications of board political ideology.
Acknowledgments
We thank Abhijith Acharya, Warren Boeker, Forrest Briscoe, Craig Crossland, Don
Hambrick, and Vilmos Misangyi for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
paper.
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Authors’ Biographies
Abhinav Gupta
is an assistant professor of management at the University of
Washington’s Foster School of Business, 527 Paccar Hall, Seattle, WA 98195 (e-mail:
abhinavg@uw.edu). His current research focuses on understanding how political ideolo-
gies of organizational stakeholders, including employees, legislators, and elites, influ-
ence organizational practices. He also studies interorganizational diffusion, social
activism, corporate governance, and strategic leadership. He received his Ph.D. in man-
agement from the Smeal College of Business of the Pennsylvania State University.
Adam J. Wowak
is an assistant professor of management at the University of Notre
Dame’s Mendoza College of Business, 353 MCOB, Notre Dame, IN 46556 (e-mail:
awowak@nd.edu). His research focuses on strategic leadership and corporate govern-
ance, with a particular emphasis on top executives and their effects on organizational
outcomes. He received his Ph.D. in management from the Pennsylvania State
University.
30
Administrative Science Quarterly 62 (2017)